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Investment in Human Capital:
Effects on Earnings
1
The original aim of this study was to estimate the money rate of
return to college and high-school education in the United States. In
order to set these estimates in the proper context, a brief formulation
of the theory of investment in human capital was undertaken. It soon
became clear to me, however, that more than a restatement was called
for; while important and pioneering work had been done on the
economic return to various occupations and education classes,
2 there
had been few, if any, attempts to treat the process of investing in
people from a general viewpoint or to work out a broad set of em-
pirical implications. I began then to prepare a general analysis of in-
vestment in human capital.
1 This chapter and the one that follows were published in somewhat different
form in Investment in Human Beings, NBER Special Conference 15, supplement
to Journal of Political Economy, October 1962, pp. 9-49.
2 In addition to the earlier works of Smith, Mill, and Marshall, see the brilliant
work (which greatly influenced my own thinking about occupational choice) by M.
Friedman and S. Kuznets, Income from Independent Professional Practice, New
York, NBER, 1945; see also H. Clark, Life Earnings in Selected Occupations in the
U.S., New York, Harper, 1937; J. R. Walsh, "Capital Concept Applied to Man," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, February 1935; G. Stigler and D. Blank, The Demand
and Supply of Scientific Personnel, New York, NBER, 1957. In recent years, of
course, there has been considerable work, especially by T. W. Schultz; see, for exam-
ple, his "Investment in Human Capital," American Economic Review, March 1961,
pp. 1-17.
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It eventually became apparent that this general analysis would do
much more than fill a gap in formal economic theory: it offers a unified
explanation of a wide range of empirical phenomena which have
either been given ad hoc interpretations or have baffled investigators.
Among these phenomena are the following: (1) Earnings typically in-
crease with age at a decreasing rate. Both the rate of increase and
the rate of retardation tend to be positively related to the level of
skill. (2) Unemployment rates tend to be inversely related to the level
of skill. (3) Firms in underdeveloped countries appear to be more
"paternalistic" toward employees than those in developed countries.
(4) Younger persons change jobs more frequently and receive more
schooling and on-the-job training than older persons do. (5) The dis-
tribution of earnings is positively skewed, especially among professional
and other skilled workers. (6) Abler persons receive more education
and other kinds of training than others. (7) The division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market. (8) The typical investor in human
capital is more impetuous and thus more likely to err than is the
typical investor in tangible capital.
What a diverse and even confusing array! Yet all these, as well as
many other important empirical implications, can be derived from
very simple theoretical arguments. The purpose here is to set out these
arguments in general form, with the emphasis placed on empirical im-
plications, although little empirical material is presented. Systematic
empirical work appears in Part Two.
In this chapter a lengthy discussion of on-the-job training is presented
and then, much more briefly, discussions of investment in schooling;,
information, and health. On-the-job training is dealt with so elaborately
not because it is more important than other kinds of investment in
human capital—although its importance is often underrated—but
because it clearly illustrates the effect of human capital on earnings,
employment, and other economic variables. For example, the close con-
nection between indirect and direct costs and the effect of human
capital on earnings at different ages are vividly brought out. The
extended discussion of on-the-job training paves the way for much
briefer discussions of other kinds of investment in human beings.
1. On-the-job Training
Theories of firm behavior, no matter how they differ in other respects,
almost invariably ignore the effect of the productive process itself on
worker productivity. This is not to say that no one recognizes thatON-THE-JOB TRAINING 31
productivity is affected by the job itself; but the recognition has not
been formalized, incorporated into economic analysis, and its impli-
cations worked out. I now intend to do just that, placing special em-
phasis on the broader economic implications.
Many workers increase their productivity by learning new skills and
perfecting old ones while on the job. Presumably, future productivity
can be improved only at a cost, for otherwise there would be an un-
limited demand for training. Included in cost are the value placed on
the time and effort of trainees, the "teaching" provided by others, and
the equipment and materials used. These are costs in the sense that
they could have been used in producing current output if they had
not been used in raising future output. The amount spent and the
duration of the training period depend partly on the type of training
since more is spent for a longer time on, say, an intern than a machine
operator.
Consider explicitly now a firm that is hiring employees for a speci-
fied time period (in the limiting case this period approaches zero), and
for the moment assume that both labor and product markets are per-
fectly competitive. If there were no on-the-job training, wage rates
would be given to the firm and would be independent of its actions.
A profit-maximizing firm would be in equilibrium when marginal
products equaled wages, that is, when marginal receipts equaled mar-
ginal expenditures. In symbols
MP = W, (1)
where W equals wages or expenditures and MP equals the marginal
product or receipts. Firms would not worry too much about the rela-
tion between labor conditions in the present and future, partly be-
cause workers would only be hired for one period and partly because
wages and marginal products in future periods would be independent
of a firm's current behavior. It can therefore legitimately be assumed
that workers have unique marginal products (for given amounts of
other inputs) and wages in each period, which are, respectively, the
maximum productivity in all possible uses and the market wage rate.
A more complete set of equilibrium conditions would be the set
MPt = Wt, (2)
where t refers to the tt\\ period. The equilibrium position for each
period would depend only on the flows during that period.
These conditions are altered when account is taken of on-the-job32 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
training and the connection thereby created between present and
future receipts and expenditures. Training might lower current re-
ceipts and raise current expenditures, yet firms could profitably pro-
vide this training if future receipts were sufficiently raised or future
expenditures sufficiently lowered. Expenditures during each period
need not equal wages, receipts need not equal the maximum possible
marginal productivity, and expenditures and receipts during all periods
would be interrelated. The set of equilibrium conditions summarized
in equation (2) would be replaced by an equality between the present
values of receipts and expenditures. If Et and Rt represent expenditures
and receipts during period t, and i the market discount rate, then the
equilibrium condition can be written as
n—1 o n—1 p
when n represents the number of periods, and Rt and Et depend on
all other receipts and expenditures. The equilibrium condition of
equation (2) has been generalized, for if marginal product equals wages
in each period, the present value of the marginal product stream would
have to equal the present value of the wage stream. Obviously, how-
ever, the converse need not hold.
If training were given only during the initial period, expenditures
during the initial period would equal wages plus the outlay on train-
ing, expenditures during other periods would equal wages alone, and





where k measures the outlay on training.
If a new term is defined,
equation (4) can be written as
MP0 + G = Wo + k. (6)ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 33
Since the term k measures only the actual outlay on training, it does
not entirely measure training costs, for it excludes the time that a
person spends on this training, time that could have been used to
produce current output. The difference between what could have been
produced, MP0', and what is produced, MP0, is the opportunity cost
of the time spent in training. If C is denned as the sum of opportunity
costs and outlays on training, (6) becomes
MP0' + G = Wo + C. (7)
The term G, the excess of future receipts over future outlays, is a
measure of the return to the firm from providing training; and, there-
fore, the difference between G and C measures the difference between
the return from and the cost of training. Equation (7) shows that the
marginal product would equal wages in the initial period only when
the return equals costs, or G equals C; it would be greater or less than
wages as the return was smaller or greater than costs. Those familiar
with capital theory might argue that this generalization of the simple
equality between marginal product and wages is spurious because a
full equilibrium would require equality between the return from an
investment—in this case, made on the job—and costs. If this implied
that G equals C, marginal product would equal wages in the initial
period. There is much to be said for the relevance of a condition
equating the return from an investment with costs, but such a con-
dition does not imply that G equals C or that marginal product equals
wages. The following discussion demonstrates that great care is re-
quired in the application of this condition to on-the-job investment.
Our treatment of on-the-job training produced some general results
—summarized in equations (3) and (7)—of wide applicability, but more
concrete results require more specific assumptions. In the following
sections two types of on-the-job training are discussed in turn: general
and specific.
General Training
General training is useful in many firms besides those providing it;
for example, a machinist trained in the army finds his skills of value
in steel and aircraft firms, and a doctor trained (interned) at one
hospital finds his skills useful at other hospitals. Most on-the-job train-
ing presumably increases the future marginal productivity of workers
in the firms providing it; general training, however, also increases their34 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
marginal product in many other firms as well. Since in a competitive
labor market the wage rates paid by any firm are determined by mar-
ginal productivities in other firms, future wage rates as well as mar-
ginal products would increase in firms providing general training.
These firms could capture some of the return from training only if
their marginal product rose by more than their wages. "Perfectly
general" training would be equally useful in many firms and marginal
products would rise by the same extent in all of them. Consequently,
wage rates would rise by exactly the same amount as the marginal
product and the firms providing such training could not capture any of
the return.
Why, then, would rational firms in competitive labor markets pro-
vide general training if it did not bring any return? The answer is
that firms would provide general training only if they did not have,
to pay any of the costs. Persons receiving general training would be
willing to pay these costs since training raises their future wages.
Hence it is the trainees, not the firms, who would bear the cost of
general training and profit from the return.
3
These and other implications of general training can be more
formally demonstrated in equation (7). Since wages and marginal
products are raised by the same amount, MPt must equal Wt for all
t = 1, . . . n — 1, and therefore
^ MP, - W. _ .
G~h (i + .v "°-
 (8
)
Equation (7) is reduced to
MP0' = Wo + C, (9)
or
Wo = MP0' - C. (10)
In terms of actual marginal product
MP0 = Wn + k, (9')
3 Some persons have asked why any general training is provided if firms do not
collect any of the returns. The answer is simply that they have an incentive to do
so wherever the demand price for training is at least as great as the supply price
or cost of providing the training. Workers in turn would prefer to be trained on
the job rather than in specialized firms (schools) if the training and work com-
plemented each other (see the discussion in section 2 below).ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 35
or
Wo = MP0 - k. (10')
The wage of trainees would not equal their opportunity marginal
product but would be less by the total cost of training. In other words,
employees would pay for general training by receiving wages below
their current (opportunity) productivity. Equation (10) has many
other implications, and the rest of this section is devoted to develop-
ing the more important ones.
Some might argue that a really "net" definition of marginal product,
obtained by subtracting training costs from "gross" marginal product,
must equal wages even for trainees. Such an interpretation of net
productivity could formally save the equality between marginal
product and wages here, but not always, as shown later. Moreover, re-
gardless of which interpretation is used, training costs would have
to be included in any study of the relation between wages and pro-
ductivity.
Employees pay for general on-the-job training by receiving wages
below what they could receive elsewhere. "Earnings" during the train-
ing period would be the difference between an income or flow term
(potential marginal product) and a capital or stock term (training
costs), so that the capital and income accounts would be closely inter-
mixed, with changes in either affecting wages. In other words, earn-
ings of persons receiving on-the-job training would be net of invest-
ment costs and would correspond to the definition of net earnings
used throughout this paper, which subtracts all investment costs from
"gross" earnings. Therefore, our departure with this definition of earn-
ings from the accounting conventions used for transactions in material
goods—which separate income from capital accounts to prevent a
transaction in capital from ipso facto
4 affecting the income side—is
not capricious but is grounded in a fundamental difference between
the way investment in material and human capital are "written off."
The underlying cause of this difference undoubtedly is the widespread
reluctance to treat people as capital and the accompanying tendency
to treat all wage receipts as earnings.
Intermixing the capital and income accounts could make the re-
ported "incomes" of trainees unusually low and perhaps negative,
even though their long-run or lifetime incomes were well above
average. Since a considerable fraction of young persons receive some
4 Of course, a shift between assets with different productivities would affect the
income account on material goods even with current accounting practices.36 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
training, and since trainees tend to have lower current and higher
subsequent earnings than other youth, the correlation of current con
sumption with the current earnings of young males
5 would not only
be much weaker than the correlation with long-run earnings, but the
signs of these correlations might even differ.
6
Doubt has been cast on the frequent assertion that no allowance is
made in the income accounts for depreciation on human capital.
7 A
depreciation-type item is deducted, at least from the earnings due to
on-the-job training, for the cost would be deducted during the train
ing period. Depreciation on tangible capital does not bulk so large in
any one period because it is usually "written off" or depreciated dur
ing a period of time designed to approximate its economic life. Hence
human and tangible capital appear to differ more in the time pattern
of depreciation than in its existence,
8 and the effect on wage income
of a rapid "write-off" of human capital is what should be emphasized
and studied.
This point can be demonstrated differently and more rigorously.
The ideal depreciation on a capital asset during any period would
equal its change in value during the period. In particular, if value
rose, a negative depreciation term would have to be subtracted or a
positive appreciation term added to the income from the asset. Since
training costs would be deducted from earnings during the training
period, the economic "value" of a trainee would at first increase rather
than decrease with age, and only later begin to decrease. Therefore,,
5 The term "young males" rather than "young families" is used because, as J,.
Mincer has shown (in his "Labor Force Participation of Married Women," Aspects
of Labor Economics, Princeton for NBER, 1962), the labor force participation of
wives is positively correlated with the difference between a husband's long-run and
current income. Participation of wives, therefore, makes the correlation between a
family's current and a husband's long-run income greater than that between a.
husband's current and long-run income.
6 A difference in signs is impossible in Friedman's analysis of consumer behavior
because he assumes that, at least in the aggregate, transitory and long-run (that is:,
permanent) incomes are uncorrelated (see his A Theory of the Consumption Func-
tion, Princeton for NBER, 1957); I am suggesting that they may be negatively
correlated for young persons.
7 See C. Christ, "Patinkin on Money, Interest, and Prices," Journal of Political
Economy, August 1957, p. 352; and W. Hamburger, "The Relation of Consumption
to Wealth and the Wage Rate," Econometrica, January 1955.
8 R. Goode has argued (see his "Educational Expenditures and the Income Tax,"
in Selma J. Mushkin, ed., Economics of Higher Education, Washington, 1962) that
educated persons should be permitted to subtract from income a depreciation
allowance on tuition payments. Such an allowance is apparently not required for
on-the-job training costs or, as seen later, for the indirect costs of education; in-
deed, one might argue, on the contrary, that too much or too rapid depreciation is;
permitted on such investments.ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 37
a negative rather than a positive depreciation term would have to be
subtracted initially.
9
Training has an important effect on the relation between earnings
and age. Suppose that untrained persons received the same earnings
regardless of age, as shown by the horizontal line UU in Chart 1.
Trained persons would receive lower earnings during the training
period because training is paid for at that time, and higher earnings
at later ages because the return is collected then. The combined effect
of paying for and collecting the return from training in this way
would be to make the age-earnings curve of trained persons, shown by
TT in Chart 1, steeper than that of untrained persons, the difference
CHART 1
Relation of Earnings to Age
Earnings
Age
being greater the greater the cost of, and return from, the investment.
Not only does training make the curve steeper but, as indicated by
Chart 1, also more concave; that is, the rate of increase in earnings
is affected more at younger than at older ages. Suppose, to take an
extreme case, that training raised the level of marginal productivity
but had no effect on the slope, so that the marginal productivity of
»See Chapter VII, section 2, for some empirical estimates of "depreciation" on
human capital.38 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
trained persons was also independent of age. If earnings equaled mar-
ginal product, TT would merely be parallel to and higher than UU,
showing neither slope nor concavity. Since, however, earnings of
trained persons would be below marginal productivity during the
training period and equal afterward, they would rise sharply at the
end of the training period and then level off (as shown by the dashed
line T'T' in Chart 1), imparting a concave appearance to the curve
as a whole. In this extreme case an extreme concavity appears (as in
TT); in less extreme cases the principle would be the same and the
concavity more continuous.
Foregone earnings are an important, although neglected, cost of
much investment in human capital and should be treated in the same
way as direct outlays. Indeed, all costs appear as foregone earnings to
workers receiving on-the-job training; that is, all costs appear as lower
earnings than could be received elsewhere, although direct outlays, C.
may really be an important part of costs. The arbitrariness of the
division between indirect and direct costs and the resulting advantage
of treating total costs as a whole
1
0 can be further demonstrated by
contrasting school and on-the-job training. Usually only the direct
costs of school training are emphasized, even though opportunity costs
are sometimes (as with college education) an important part of the
total. A shift from school training to on-the-job training would, how-
ever, reverse the emphasis and make all costs appear as foregone
earnings, even when direct outlays were important.
Income-maximizing firms in competitive labor markets would not
pay the cost of general training and would pay trained persons the
market wage. If, however, training costs were paid, many persons
would seek training, few would quit during the training period, and
labor costs would be relatively high. Firms that did not pay trained
persons the market wage would have difficulty satisfying their skill
requirements and would also tend to be less profitable than other
firms. Firms that paid both for training and less than the market wage
for trained persons would have the worst of both worlds, for they
would attract too many trainees and too few trained persons.
These principles have been clearly demonstrated during the last
few years in discussions of problems in recruiting military personnel.
10 The equivalence between indirect and direct costs applies to consumption as
well as to investment decisions. In my paper A Theory of the Allocation of Time,
IBM Research Paper RC 1149, March 20, 1964, an analysis incorporating both
direct and indirect consumption costs is applied to the choice between work and
nonwork, price and income elasticities of demand for goods, the economic function
of queues, and several other areas. A shortened version was published with the same
title in the Economic Journal of September 1965.ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 39
The military offers training in a wide variety of skills and many are
very useful in the civilian sector. Training is provided during part or
all of the first enlistment period and used during the remainder of
the first period and hopefully during subsequent periods. This hope,
however, is thwarted by the fact that reenlistment rates tend to be
inversely related to the amount of civilian-type skills provided by the
military.
1
1 Persons with these skills leave the military more readily
because they can receive much higher wages in the civilian sector.
Net military wages for those receiving training are higher relative to
civilian wages during the first than during subsequent enlistment
periods because training costs are largely paid by the military. Not
surprisingly, therefore, first-term enlistments for skilled jobs are ob-
tained much more easily than are reenlistments.
The military is a conspicuous example of an organization that both
pays at least part of training costs and does not pay market wages to
skilled personnel. It has had, in consequence, relatively easy access to
"students" and heavy losses of "graduates." Indeed, its graduates make
up the predominant part of the supply in several civilian occupations.
For example, well over 90 per cent of United States commercial air-
line pilots received much of their training in the armed forces. The
military, of course, is not a commercial organization judged by profits
and losses and has had no difficulty surviving and even thriving.
What about the old argument that firms in competitive labor mar-
kets have no incentive to provide on-the-job training because trained
workers would be bid away by other firms? Firms that train workers
are supposed to impart external economies to other firms because the
latter can use these workers free of any training charge. An analogy
with research and development is often drawn since a firm developing
a process that cannot be patented or kept secret would impart ex-
ternal economies to competitors. This argument and analogy would
apply if firms were to pay training costs, for they would suffer a
"capital loss" whenever trained workers were bid away by other firms.
Firms can, however, shift training costs to trainees and have an in-
centive to do so when faced with competition for their services.
1
2
11 See Manpower Management and Compensation, report of the Cordiner Com-
mittee, Washington, D.C., 1957, Vol. I, Chart 3, and the accompanying discussion.
The military not only wants to eliminate the inverse relation but apparently would
like to create a positive relation because they have such a large investment in heavily
trained personnel. For an excellent study, see Gorman C. Smith, "Differential Pay
for Military Technicians," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,
1964.
12 Sometimes the alleged external economies from on-the-job training have been
considered part of the "infant industry" argument for protection (see J. Black,40 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
The difference between investment in training and in research and
development can be put very simply. Without patents or secrecy, firms
in competitive industries may have difficulty establishing property
rights in innovations, and these innovations may become fair game
for all comers. Patent systems try to establish these rights so that
incentives can be provided to invest in research. Property rights In
skills, on the other hand, are automatically vested, for a skill cannot
be used without permission of the person possessing it. The property
right of the worker in his skills is the source of his incentive to invest
in training by accepting a reduced wage during the training period
and explains why an analogy with unowned innovations is misleading.
Specific Training
Completely general training increases the marginal productivity of
trainees by exactly the same amount in the firms providing the train-
ing as in other firms. Clearly some kinds of training increase produc-
tivity by different amounts in the firms providing the training and in
other firms. Training that increases productivity more in firms provid-
ing it will be called specific training. Completely specific training can
be defined as training that has no effect on the productivity of trainees
that would be useful in other firms. Much on-the-job training is
neither completely specific nor completely general but increases pro-
ductivity more in the firms providing it and falls within the definition
of specific training. The rest increases productivity by at least as much
in other firms and falls within a definition of general training. A few
illustrations of the scope of specific training are presented before a
formal analysis is developed.
The military offers some forms of training that are extremely use-
ful in the civilian sector, as already noted, and others that are only of
minor use to civilians, i.e., astronauts, fighter pilots, and missile men.
Such training falls within the scope of specific training because pro-
ductivity is raised in the military but not (much) elsewhere.
"Arguments for Tariffs," Oxford Economic Papers, June 1959, pp. 205-206). Our
analysis suggests, however, that the trouble tariffs are supposed to overcome must
be traced back to difficulties that workers have in financing investment in them-
selves—in other words, to ignorance or capital market limitations that apply to
expenditures on education and health, as well as on-the-job training. Protection
would serve the same purpose as the creation of monopsonies domestically, namely,
to convert general into specific capital so that firms can be given an incentive to
pay for training (see the remarks on specific training below and in section 4 of this
chapter). Presumably a much more efficient solution would be to improve the
capital market directly through insurance of loans, subsidies, information, etc.ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 41
Resources are usually spent by firms in familiarizing new employees
with their organization,
1
3 and the knowledge thus acquired is a form
of specific training because productivity is raised more in the firms
acquiring the knowledge than in other firms. Other kinds of hiring
costs, such as employment agency fees, the expenses incurred by new
employees in finding jobs, or the time employed in interviewing, test-
ing, checking references, and in bookkeeping do not so obviously in-
crease the knowledge of new employees, but they too are a form of
specific investment in human capital, although not training. They are
an investment because outlays over a short period create distributed
effects on productivity; they are specific because productivity is raised
primarily in the firms making the outlays; they are in human capital
because they lose their value whenever employees leave. In the rest of
this section reference is mostly to on-the-job specific training even
though the analysis applies to all on-the-job specific investment.
Even after hiring costs are incurred, firms usually know only a
limited amount about the ability and potential of new employees.
They try to increase their knowledge in various ways—testing, rotation
among departments, trial and error, etc.—for greater knowledge per-
mits a more efficient utilization of manpower. Expenditures on acquir-
ing knowledge of employee talents would be a specific investment if
the knowledge could be kept from other firms, for then productivity
would be raised more in the firms making the expenditures than
elsewhere.
The effect of investment in employees on their productivity else-
where depends on market conditions as well as on the nature of the
investment. Very strong monopsonists might be completely insulated
from competition by other firms, and practically all investments in
their labor force would be specific. On the other hand, firms in ex-
tremely competitive labor markets would face a constant threat of
raiding and would have fewer specific investments available.
These examples convey some of the surprisingly large variety of
situations that come under the rubric of specific investment. This set
is now treated abstractly in order to develop a general formal analysis.
Empirical situations are brought in again after several major implica-
tions of the formal analysis have been developed.
If all training were completely specific, the wage that an employee
could get elsewhere would be independent of the amount of training
he had received. One might plausibly argue, then, that the wage paid
13 To judge from a sample of firms analyzed, formal orientation courses are
quite common, at least in large firms (see H. F. Clark and H. S. Sloan, Classrooms
in the Factories, New York, 1958, Chapter IV).42 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
by firms would also be independent of training. If so, firms would
have to pay training costs, for no rational employee would pay for
training that did not benefit him. Firms would collect the return from
such training in the form of larger profits resulting from higher pro-
ductivity, and training would be provided whenever the return—dis-
counted at an appropriate rate—was at least as large as the cost.
Long-run competitive equilibrium requires that the present value oi:
the return exactly equal costs.
These propositions can be stated more formally with the equations
developed earlier. According to equations (5) and (7), the equilibrium
of a firm providing training in competitive markets can be written as
where C is the cost of training given only in the initial period, MP0'
is the opportunity marginal product of trainees, Wo is the wage paid
to trainees, and Wt and MPt are the wage and marginal product in
period t. If the analysis of completely specific training given in the
preceding paragraph is correct, W would always equal the wage that
could be received elsewhere, MPt — Wt would be the full return in t
from training given in 0, and G would be the present value of these
returns. Since MP()' measures the marginal product elsewhere and Wo
measures the wage elsewhere of trainees, MPJ equals Wo. As a conse
quence G equals C, or, in full equilibrium, the return from training
equals costs.
Before claiming that the usual equality between marginal product
and wages holds when completely specific training is considered, the
reader should bear in mind two points. The first is that the equality
between wages and marginal product in the initial period involves
opportunity, not actual marginal product. Wages would be greater
than actual marginal product if some productivity were foregone as
part of the training program. The second is that, even if wages
equaled marginal product initially, they would be less in the future
because the differences between future marginal products and wages
constitute the return to training and are collected by the firm.
All of this follows from the assumption that firms pay all costs and
collect all returns. But could not one equally well argue that workers
pay all specific training costs by receiving appropriately lower wages
initially and collect all returns by receiving wages equal to marginal
product later? In terms of equation (11), Wt would equal MPt, G
would equal zero, and W() would equal MP0' — C, just as with generalON-THE-JOB TRAINING 43
training. Is it more plausible that firms rather than workers pay for
and collect any return from training?
An answer can be found by reasoning along the following lines. If
a firm had paid for the specific training of a worker who quit to take
another job, its capital expenditure would be partly wasted, for no
further return could be collected. Likewise, a worker fired after he
had paid for specific training would be unable to collect any further
return and would also suffer a capital loss. The willingness of workers
or firms to pay for specific training should, therefore, closely depend
on the likelihood of labor turnover.
To bring in turnover at this point may seem like introducing a deus
ex machina, since turnover is almost always ignored in traditional
theory. In the usual analysis of competitive firms, wages equal marginal
product, and since wages and marginal product are assumed to be
the same in many firms, no one suffers from turnover. It would not
matter whether a firm's labor force always contained the same persons
or a rapidly changing group. Any person leaving one firm could do
equally well in other firms, and his employer could replace him with-
out any change in profits. In other words, turnover is ignored in
traditional theory because it plays no important role within the frame-
work of the theory.
Turnover becomes important when costs are imposed on workers
or firms, which are precisely the effects of specific training. Suppose a
firm paid all the specific training costs of a worker who quit after
completing the training. According to our earlier analysis, he would
have been receiving the market wage and a new employee could be
hired at the same wage. If the new employee were not given training,
his marginal product would be less than that of the one who quit since
presumably training raised the latter's productivity. Training could
raise the new employee's productivity but would require additional ex-
penditures by the firm. In other words, a firm is hurt by the departure
of a trained employee because an equally profitable new employee
could not be obtained. In the same way an employee who pays for
specific training would suffer a loss from being laid off because he
could not find an equally good job elsewhere. To bring turnover into
the analysis of specific training is not, therefore, to introduce a deus
ex machina but is made necessary by the important link between them.
Firms paying for specific training might take account of turnover
merely by obtaining a sufficiently large return from those remaining
to counterbalance the loss from those leaving. (The return on "suc-
cesses"—those remaining—would, of course, overestimate the average
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ever, by recognizing that the likelihood of a quit is not fixed but
depends on wages. Instead of merely recouping on successes what is
lost on failures, they might reduce the likelihood of failure itself by
offering higher wages after training than could be received elsewhere.
In effect, they would offer employees some of the return from training.
Matters would be improved in some respects but worsened in others,
for the higher wage would make the supply of trainees greater than
the demand, and rationing would be required. The final step would
be to shift some training costs as well as returns to employees, thereby
bringing supply more in line with demand. When the final step is
completed, firms no longer pay all training costs nor do they collect
all the return but they share both with employees.
1
4 The shares of
each depend on the relations between quit rates and wages, layoff
rates and profits, and on other factors not discussed here, such as the
cost of funds, attitudes toward risk, and desires for liquidity.
1
5
If training were not completely specific, productivity would increase
in other firms as well, and the wage that could be received elsewhere
would also increase. Such training can be looked upon as the sum of
two components, one completely general, the other completely spe-
cific; the former would be relatively larger, the greater the effect on
wages in other firms relative to the firms providing the training. Since
firms do not pay any of the completely general costs and only part of
the completely specific costs, the fraction of costs paid by firms would
be inversely related to the importance of the general component, or
positively related to the specificity of the training.
Our conclusions can be stated formally in terms of the equations
developed earlier. If G is the present value of the return from training
collected by firms, the fundamental equation is
MF + G = W+C. (12)
14 A. Marshall (Principles of Economics, 8th ed.. New York, 1949, p. 626) was
clearly aware of specific talents and their effect on wages and productivity: "Thus
the head clerk in a business has an acquaintance with men and things, the use of
which he could in some cases sell at a high price to rival firms. But in other cases
it is of a kind to be of no value save to the business in which he already is; and
then his departure would perhaps injure it by several times the value of his salary,
while probably he could not get half that salary elsewhere." (My italics.) However,
he overstressed the element of indeterminacy in these wages ("their earnings are
determined ... by a bargain between them and their employers, the terms of
which are theoretically arbitrary") because he ignored the effect of wages on turn-
over (ibid., fn. 2).
15 The rate used to discount costs and returns is the sum of a (positive) rate
measuring the cost of funds, a (positive or negative) risk premium, and a liquidity
premium that is presumably positive since capital invested in specific training is
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If G' measures the return collected by employees, the total return, G",
would be the sum of G and G'. In full equilibrium the total return
would equal total costs, or G" = C. Let a represent the fraction of the
total return collected by firms. Since G = aG" and G" = C, equation
(12) can be written as
MF + aC= W+C, (13)
or
W = MP' - (1 - a)C.
16 (14)
Employees pay the same fraction of costs, 1 — a, as they collect in
returns, which generalizes the results obtained earlier. For if training
were completely general, a = 0, and equation (14) reduces to equation
(10); if firms collected all the return from trailing, a = 1, and (14) re-
duces to MP0' = Wo; and if 0 < a < 1, none of the earlier equations
is satisfactory.
A few major implications of this analysis of specific training are
now developed.
Rational firms pay generally trained employees the same wage and
specifically trained employees a higher wage than they could get else-
where. A reader might easily believe the contrary—namely, that gen-
eral training would command a higher wage relative to alternatives
than specific training does, since, after all, competition for persons
with the latter is apt to be weaker than for those with the former.
This view, however, overlooks the fact that general training raises the
wages that could be received elsewhere while (completely) specific
training does not, so a comparison with alternative wages gives a mis-
leading impression of the absolute effect on wages of different types of
training. Moreover, firms are not too concerned about the turnover of
employees with general training and have no incentive to offer them a
premium above wages elsewhere because the cost of such training is
borne entirely by employees. Firms are concerned about the turnover
of employees with specific training, and a premium is offered to re-
duce their turnover because firms pay part of their training costs.
The part of specific training paid by employees has effects similar
16 If G" did not equal C, these equations would be slightly more complicated.
Suppose, for example, G" = G + G' = C + n, n > 0, so that the present value of
the total return would be greater than total cysts. Then G = aG
n — aC + an, and
MP' + aC + an = W + C,
or
W = MP
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to those discussed earlier tor general training: it is also paid by a
reduction in wages during the training period, tends to make age-
earnings profiles steeper and more concave, etc. The part paid by
firms has none of these implications, since current or future wages
would not be affected.
Specific, unlike general, training produces certain "external" effects,
for quits prevent firms from capturing the full return on costs paid by
them, and layoffs do the same to employees. These, however, are ex-
ternal diseconomies imposed on the employees or employers of firms
providing the training, not external economies accruing to other firms.
Employees with specific training have less incentive to quit, and
firms have less incentive to fire them,, than employees with no training
or general training, which implies that quit and layoff rates are in-
versely related to the amount of specific training. Turnover should be
least for employees with extremely specific training and most for those
receiving such general training that productivity is raised less in the
firms providing the training than elsewhere (say, in schools). These
propositions are as applicable to the large number of irregular quits
and layoffs that continually occur as to the more regular cyclical and
secular movements in turnover; in this section, however, only the
more regular movements are discussed.
Consider a firm that experiences an unexpected decline in demand
for its output, the rest of the economy being unaffected. The marginal
product of employees without specific training—such as untrained or
generally trained employees—presumably equaled wages initially, and
their employment would now be reduced to prevent their marginal
productivity from falling below wages. The marginal product of spe-
cifically trained employees initially would have been greater than
wages. A decline in demand would reduce these marginal products
too, but as long as they were reduced by less than the initial differ-
ence with wages, firms would have no incentive to lay off such employ-
ees. For sunk costs are sunk, and there is no incentive to lay off
employees whose marginal product is greater than wages, no matter
how unwise it was, in retrospect, to invest in their training. Thus
workers with specific training seem less likely to be laid off as a con-




If the decline in demand were sufficiently great so that even the
17 A very similar argument is developed by Walter Oi in "Labor as a Quasi-fixed
Factor of Production," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1961.
Also, see his article with almost the same title in Journal of Political Economy,
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marginal product of specifically trained workers was pushed below
wages, would the firm just proceed to lay them off until the marginal
product was brought into equality with wages? To show the danger
here, assume that all the cost of and return from specific training was
paid and collected by the firm. Any worker laid off would try to find
a new job, since nothing would bind him to the old one.
1
8 The firm
might be hurt if he did find a new job, for the firm's investment in
his training might be lost forever. If specifically trained workers were
not laid off, the firm would lose now because marginal product would
be less than wages but would gain in the future if the decline in de-
mand proved temporary. There is an incentive, therefore, not to lay
off workers with specific training when their marginal product is only
temporarily below wages, and the larger a firm's investment the
greater the incentive not to lay them off.
A worker collecting some of the return from specific training would
have less incentive to find a new job when temporarily laid off than
others would: he does not want to lose his investment. His behavior
while laid off in turn affects his future chances of being laid off, for
if it were known that he would not readily take another job, the firm
could lay him off without much fear of losing its investment.
These conclusions can be briefly summarized. If one firm alone
experienced an unexpected decline in demand, relatively few workers
with specific training would be laid off, if only because their marginal
product was initially greater than their wage. If the decline were per-
manent, all workers would be laid off when their marginal product
became less than their wage and all those laid off would have to find
jobs elsewhere. If the decline were temporary, specifically trained
workers might not be laid off even though their marginal product was
less than their wage because the firm would suffer if they took other
jobs. The likelihood of their taking other jobs would be inversely
related, and therefore the likelihood of their being laid off would be
positively related, to the extent of their own investment in training.
The analysis can easily be extended to cover general declines in
demand; suppose, for example, a general cyclical decline occurred.
Assume that wages were sticky and remained at the initial level. If the
decline in business activity were not sufficient to reduce the marginal
product below the wage, workers with specific training would not be
laid off even though others would be, just as before. If the decline
reduced marginal product below wages, only one modification in the
is Actually one need only assume that the quit rate of laid-off workers tends to
be significantly greater than that of employed workers, if only because the op-
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previous analysis is required. A firm would have a greater incentive
to lay off specifically trained workers than when it alone experienced
a decline because laid-off workers would be less likely to find other
jobs when unemployment was widespread. In other respects, the im-
plications of a general decline with wage rigidity are the same as
those of a decline in one firm alone.
The discussion has concentrated on layoff rates, but the same kind
of reasoning shows that a rise in wages elsewhere would cause fewer
quits among specifically trained workers than among others. Spe-
cifically trained workers initially receive higher wages than are avail-
able elsewhere and the wage rise elsewhere would have to be greater
than the initial difference before they would consider quitting. Thus
both the quit and layoff rate of specifically trained workers would be
relatively low and fluctuate relatively less during business cycles.
These are important implications that can be tested with the data
available.
Although quits and layoffs are influenced by considerations other
than investment costs, some of these, such as pension plans, are more
strongly related to investments than may appear at first blush. A
pension plan with incomplete vesting privileges
1
9 penalizes employees
who quit before retirement and thus provides an incentive—often an
extremely powerful one—not to quit. At the same time pension plans
"insure" firms against quits for they are given a lump sum—the non-
vested portion of payments—whenever a worker quits. Insurance is
needed for specifically trained employees because their turnover
would impose capital losses on firms. Firms can discourage such quits
by sharing training costs and the return with employees, but they
would have less need to discourage them and would be more willing
to pay for training costs if insurance were provided. The effects on
the incentive to invest in one's employees may have been a major




An effective long-term contract would insure firms against quits,
just as pensions do and also insure employees against layoffs. Firms
would be more willing to pay for all kinds of training—assuming
19 According to the National Bureau study of pensions, most plans have incom-
plete vesting. See R. F. Murray, Economic Aspects of Pensions: A Summary Report,
New York, NBER, 1968.
20 This economic function of incomplete vesting should caution one against con-
ceding to the agitation for more liberal vesting privileges. Of course, in recent
years pensions have also been an important tax-saving device, which certainly has
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future wages were set at an appropriate level—since a contract, in
effect, converts all training into completely specific training. A casual
reading of history suggests tha£ long-term contracts have, indeed,
been primarily a means of inducing firms to undertake large invest-
ments in employees. These contracts are seldom used today in the
United States,
2
1 and while they have declined in importance over
time, they were probably always the exception here largely because
courts have considered them a form of involuntary servitude. More-
over, any enforceable contract could at best specify the hours required
on a job, not the quality of performance. Since performance can vary
widely, unhappy workers could usually "sabotage" operations to in-
duce employers to release them from contracts.
Some training may be useful not in most firms nor in a single firm,
but in a set of firms defined by product, type of work, or geographical
location. For example, carpentry training would raise productivity
primarily in the construction industry, and French legal training
would not be very useful in the United States. Such training would
tend to be paid by trainees, since a single firm could not readily col-
lect the return,
2
2 and in this respect would be the same as general
training. In one respect, however, it is similar to specific training.
Workers with training "specific" to an industry, occupation, or coun-
try are less likely to leave that industry, occupation, or country than
other workers, so their industrial, occupational, or country "turnover"
would be less than average. The same result is obtained for specific
training, except that a firm rather than an industry, occupation, or
country is used as the unit of observation in measuring turnover. An
analysis of specific training, therefore, is helpful also in understanding
the effects of certain types of "general" training.
Although a discrepancy between marginal product and wages is
frequently taken as evidence of imperfections in the competitive sys-
tem, it would occur even in a perfectly competitive system where there
is investment in specific training. The investment approach provides
a very different interpretation of some common phenomena, as can
be seen from the following examples.
A positive difference between marginal product and wages is usu-
ally said to be evidence of monopsony power; just as the ratio of
product price to marginal cost has been suggested as a measure of
21 The military and the entertainment industry are the major exceptions.
22 Sometimes firms cooperate in paying training costs, especially when training
apprentices (see R. F. Arnold, A Look at Industrial Training in Mercer County, N.J.,
Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 3).50 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
monopoly power, so has the ratio of marginal product to wages been
suggested as a measure of monopsony power. But specific training
would also make this ratio greater than one. Does the difference be-
tween the marginal product and the earnings of major-league base-
ball players, for example, measure monopsony power or the return
on a team's investment? Since teams do spend a great deal on develop-
ing players, some and perhaps most of the difference must be con-
sidered a return on investment (even if there were no uncertainty
about the abilities of different players).
2
3
Earnings might differ greatly among firms, industries, and countries
and yet there might be relatively little worker mobility. The usual
explanation would be that workers were either irrational or faced
with formidable obstacles in moving. However, if specific
2
4 training
were important, differences in earnings would be a misleading esti-
mate of what "migrants" could receive, and it might be perfectly
rational not to move. For example, although French lawyers earn less
than American lawyers, the average French lawyer could not earn the
average American legal income simply by migrating to the United




In extreme types of monopsony, exemplified by an isolated com-
pany town, job alternatives for both trained and untrained workers
are nil, and all training, no matter what its nature, would be specific
to the firm. Monopsony combined with control of a product or an
occupation (due, say, to antipirating agreements) converts training
specific to that product or occupation into firm-specific training.
These kinds of monopsony increase the importance of specific train-
ing and thus the incentive to invest in employees.
2
6 The effect on
training of less extreme monopsony positions is more difficult to assess.
Consider the monopsonist who pays his workers the best wage avail-
23 S. Rottenberg ("The Baseball Players' Labor Market," Journal of Political
Economy, June 1956, p. 254) argues that the strong restrictions on entry of teams
into the major leagues is prima-facie evidence that monopsony power is important,
but the entry or threat of new leagues, such as have occurred in professional basket-
ball and football, are a real possibility. And, of course, new teams have entered in
recent years.
24 Specific, that is, to the firms, industries, or countries in question.
25 Of course, persons who have not yet invested in themselves would have an
incentive to migrate, and this partly explains why young persons migrate more
than older ones. For a further explanation, see the discussion in Chapter III; also
see the paper by L. Sjaastad, "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration," In-
vestment in Human Beings, pp. 80-93.
26 A relatively large difference between marginal product and wages in monop-
sonies might measure, therefore, the combined effect of economic power and a
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able elsewhere. I see no reason why training should have a systemati-
cally different effect on the foregone earnings of his employees than
of those in competitive firms and, therefore, no reason why specific
training should be more (or less) important to him. But monopsony
power as a whole, including the more extreme manifestations, would
appear to increase the importance of specific training and the incen-
tive for firms to invest in human capital.
2. Schooling
A school can be defined as an institution specializing in the produc-
tion of training, as distinct from a firm that offers training in con-
junction with the production of goods. Some schools, like those for
barbers, specialize in one skill, while others, like universities, offer a
large and diverse set. Schools and firms are often substitute sources of
particular skills. This substitution is evidenced by the shift over time,
for instance, in law from apprenticeships in law firms to law schools
and in engineering from on-the-job experience to engineering schools.
2
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Some types of knowledge can be mastered better if simultaneously
related to a practical problem; others require prolonged specializa-
tion. That is, there are complementary elements between learning
and work and between learning and time. Most training in the con-
struction industry is apparently still best given on the job, while the
training of physicists requires a long period of specialized effort. The
development of certain skills requires both specialization and experi-
ence and can be had partly from firms and partly from schools.
Physicians receive apprenticeship training as interns and residents
after several years of concentrated instruction in medical schools. Or,
to take an example closer to home, a research economist spends not
only many years in school but also a rather extensive apprenticeship
in mastering the "art" of empirical and theoretical research. The
complementary elements between firms and schools depend in part
on the amount of formalized knowledge available: price theory can
be formally presented in a course, while a formal statement of the
principles used in gathering and handling empirical materials is
lacking. Training in a new industrial skill is usually first given on the
job, since firms tend to be the first to be aware of its value, but as
demand develops, some of the training shifts to schools.
27 State occupational licensing requirements often permit on-the-job training to
be substituted for school training (see S. Rottenberg, "The Economics of Occupa-
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A student does not work for pay while in school but may do so
after or before school, or during vacations. His earnings are usually
less than if he were not in school since he cannot work as much or as
regularly. The difference between what could have been and what is
earned (including any value placed on foregone leisure) is an impor-
tant indirect cost of schooling. Tuition, fees, books, supplies, and
unusual transportation and lodging expenses are other, more direct,
costs. Net earnings can be defined as the difference between actual
earnings and direct school costs. In symbols,
W = MP - k, (15)
where MP is actual marginal product (assumed equal to earnings) and
k is direct costs. If MP0 is the marginal product that could have been
received, equation (15) can be written as
W = MP0 - (MP0 - MP + k) = MP0 - C, (16)
where C is the sum of direct and indirect costs and where net earnings
are the difference between potential earnings and total costs. These
relations should be familiar since they are the same as those derived
for general on-the-job training, which suggests that a sharp distinction
between schools and firms is not always necessary: for some purposes
schools can be treated as a special kind of firm and students as a
special kind of trainee. Perhaps this is most apparent when a student
works in an enterprise controlled by his school, which frequently
occurs at many colleges.
Our definition of student net earnings may seem strange since tui-
tion and other direct costs are not usually subtracted from "gross"
earnings. Note, however, that indirect school costs are implicitly sub-
tracted, for otherwise earnings would have to be denned as the sum
of observed and foregone earnings, and foregone earnings are a major
cost of high-school, college, and adult schooling. Moreover, earnings
of on-the-job trainees would be net of all their costs, including direct
"tuition" costs. Consistent accounting, which is particularly important
when comparing earnings of persons trained in school and on the job,
would require that earnings of students be denned in the same way.
2
8
Regardless of whether all costs or merely indirect costs are sub-
28 Students often have negative net earnings and in this respect differ from most
on-the-job trainees, although at one time many apprentices also had negative earn-
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traded from potential earnings, schooling would have the same kind
of implications as general on-the-job training. Thus schooling would
steepen the age-earnings profile, mix together the income and capital
accounts, introduce a negative relation between the permanent and
current earnings of young persons, and (implicitly) provide for depre-
ciation on its capital. This supports my earlier assertion that an
analysis of on-the-job training leads to general results that apply to
other kinds of investment in human capital as well.
3. Other Knowledge
On-the-job and school training are not the only activities that raise
real income primarily by increasing the knowledge at a person's com-
mand. Information about the prices charged by different sellers would
enable a person to buy from the cheapest, thereby raising his com-
mand over resources; information about the wages offered by different
firms would enable him to work for the firm paying the highest. In
both examples, information about the economic system and about
consumption and production possibilities is increased, as distinct from
knowledge of a particular skill. Information about the political or
social system—the effect of different parties or social arrangements—
could also significantly raise real incomes.
2
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Let us consider in more detail investment in information about
employment opportunities. A better job might be found by spending
money on employment agencies and situation-wanted ads, by using
one's time to examine want ads, by talking to friends and visiting
firms, or in Stigler's language by "search."
 3
0 When the new job re-
quires geographical movement, additional time and resources would
be spent in moving.
3
1 These expenditures constitute an investment in
information about job opportunities that would yield a return in the
form of higher earnings than would otherwise have been received. If
workers paid the costs and collected the return, an investment in
2» The role of political knowledge is systematically discussed in A. Downs, An
Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, 1957, and more briefly in my "Com-
petition and Democracy," Journal of Law and Economics, October 1958.
3
0 See G. J. Stigler, "Information in the Labor Market," lnx>estment in Human
Beings, pp. 94-105.
3
1 Studies of large geographical moves—those requiring both a change in em-
ployment and consumption—have tended to emphasize the job change more than
the consumption change. Presumably money wages are considered to be more dis-
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search would have the same implications about age-earnings profiles,
depreciation., etc., as general on-the-job training and schooling, al-
though it must be noted that the direct costs of search, like the direct
costs of schooling, are usually added to consumption rather than
deducted from earnings. If firms paid the costs and collected the
return, search would have the same implications as on-the-job specific
training.
Whether workers or firms pay for search depends on the effect of a
job change on alternatives: the larger the number of alternatives made
available by a change, the larger (not the smaller) is the fraction of
costs that have to be paid by workers. Consider a few examples.
Immigrants to the United States have usually found many firms that
could use their talents, and these firms would have been reluctant to
pay the high cost of transporting workers to the United States. In fact
immigrants have almost always had to pay their own way. Even a
system of contract labor, which was seen to be a means of protecting
firms against turnover, was singularly unsuccessful in the United
States and has been infrequently used.
3
2 Firms that are relatively
insulated from competition in the labor market have an incentive to
pay the costs of workers coming from elsewhere since they have little
to worry about in the way of competing neighboring firms. In addi-
tion, firms would be willing partly to pay for search within a geo-
graphical area because some costs—such as an employment agency's
fee—would be specific to the firm doing the hiring since they must be
repeated at each job change.
4. Productive Wage Increases
One way to invest in human capital is to improve emotional and
physical health. In Western countries today earnings are much more
closely geared to knowledge than to strength, but in an earlier day,
and elsewhere still today, strength had a significant influence on
earnings. Moreover, emotional health increasingly is considered an
important determinant of earnings in all parts of the world. Health,
like knowledge, can be improved in many ways. A decline in the
death rate at working ages may improve earning prospects by extend-
ing the period during which earnings are received; a better diet adds
strength and stamina, and thus earning capacity; or an improvement
32 For a careful discussion of the contract-labor system in the United States, see
C. Erickson, American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885, Cam-
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in working conditions—higher wages, coffee breaks, and so on—may
affect morale and productivity.
Firms can invest in the health of employees through medical exami-
nations, lunches, or avoidance of activities with high accident and
death rates. An investment in health that increased productivity to
the same extent in many firms would be a general investment and
would have the same effect as general training, while an investment in
health that increased productivity more in the firms making it would
be a specific investment and would have the same effect as specific
training. Of course, most investments in health in the United States
are made outside firms, in households, hospitals, and medical offices.
A full analysis of the effect on earnings of such "outside" investment
in health is beyond the scope of this study, but I would like to discuss
a relation between on-the-job and "outside" human investments that
has received much attention in recent years.
When on-the-job investments are paid by reducing earnings during
the investment period, less is available for investments outside the job
in health, better diet, schooling, and other factors. If these "outside"
investments were more productive, some on-the-job investments would
not be undertaken even though they were very productive by "abso-
lute" standards.
Before proceeding further, one point needs to be made. The amount
invested outside the job would be related to current earnings only if
the capital market was very imperfect, for otherwise any amount of
"outside" investment could be financed with borrowed funds. The
analysis assumes, therefore, that the capital market is extremely im-
perfect, earnings and other income being a major source of funds.
3
3
A firm would be willing to pay for investment in human capital
made by employees outside the firm if it could benefit from the result-
ing increase in productivity. The only way to pay, however, would be
to offer higher wages during the investment period than would have
been offered, since direct loans to employees are prohibited by assump-
tion. When a firm gives a productive wage increase—that is, an in-
crease that raises productivity—"outside" investments are, as it were,
converted into on-the-job investments. Indeed, such a conversion is a
natural way to circumvent imperfections in the capital market and
the resultant dependence of the amount invested in human capital on
the level of wages.
The discussion can be stated more formally. Let W represent wages
33 Imperfections in the capital market with respect to investment in human
capital are discussed in section 2 of Chapter III.56 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: EFFECTS ON EARNINGS
in the absence of any investment, and let a productive wage increase
costing an amount C be the only on-the-job investment. Total costs to
the firm would be IT = W + C, and since the investment cost is re-
ceived by employees as higher wages, ir would also measure total
wages. The cost of on-the-job training is not received as higher wages,
so this formally distinguishes a productive wage increase from other
on-the-job investments. The term MP can represent the marginal
product of employees when wages equal W, and G the gain to firms
from the investment in higher wages. In full equilibrium,
MP+G = W+C = 7T. (17)
Investment would not occur if the firm's gain was nil (G = 0), for
then total wages (TT) would equal the marginal product (MP) when
there is no investment.
It has been shown that firms would benefit more from on-the-job
investment the more specific the productivity effect, the greater their
monopsony power, and the longer the labor contract; conversely, the
benefit would be less the more general the productivity effect, the less
their monopsony power, and the shorter the labor contract. For exam-
ple, a wage increase spent on a better diet with an immediate impact
on productivity might well be granted,
3
4 but not one spent on general
education with a very delayed impact.
3
5
The effect of a wage increase on productivity depends on the way
it is spent, which in turn depends on tastes, knowledge, and oppor-
tunities. Firms might exert an influence on spending by exhorting
34 The more rapid the impact, the more likely it is that it comes within the
(formal or de facto) contract period. Leibenstein apparently initially assumed a
rapid impact when discussing wage increases in underdeveloped countries (see his
"The Theory of Underemployment in Backward Economies," Journal of Political
Economy, April 1957). In a later comment he argued that the impact might be
delayed ("Underemployment in Backward Economies: Some Additional Notes,"
Journal of Political Economy, June 1958).
35 Marshall (Principles of Economics, p. 566) discusses delays of a generation or
more and notes that profit-maximizing firms in competitive industries have no
incentive to grant such wage increases.
"Again, in paying his workpeople high wages and in caring for their happiness
and culture, the liberal employer confers benefits which do not end with his own
generation. For the children of his workpeople share in them, and grow up stronger
in body and in character than otherwise they would have done. The price which
he has paid for labour will have borne the expenses of production of an increased
supply of high industrial faculties in the next generation: but these faculties will
be the property of others, who will have the right to hire them out for the best
price they will fetch: neither he nor even his heirs can reckon on reaping much
material reward for this part of the good that he has done."PRODUCTIVE WAGE INCREASES 57
employees to obtain good food, housing, and medical care, or even by
requiring purchases of specified items in company stores. Indeed, the
company store or truck system in nineteenth-century Great Britain
has been interpreted as partly designed to prevent an excessive con-
sumption of liquor and other debilitating commodities.
3
6 The preva-
lence of employer paternalism in underdeveloped countries has fre-
quently been accepted as evidence of a difference in temperament
between East and West. An alternative interpretation suggested by
our study is that an increase in consumption has a greater effect on
productivity in underdeveloped countries, and that a productivity
advance raises profits more there either because firms have more
monopsony power or because the advance is less delayed. In other
words, "paternalism" may simply be a way of investing in the health
and welfare of employees in underdeveloped countries.
An investment in human capital would usually steepen age-earn-
ings profiles, lowering reported earnings during the investment period
and raising them later on. But an investment in an increase in earn-
ings may have precisely the opposite effect, raising reported earnings
more during the investment period than later and thus flattening age-
earning profiles. The cause of this difference is simply that reported
earnings during the investment period tend to be net of the cost of




The productivity of employees depends not only on their ability
and the amount invested in them both on and off the job but also on
their motivation, or the intensity of their work. Economists have long
recognized that motivation in turn partly depends on earnings be-
cause of the effect of an increase in earnings on morale and aspira-
tions. Equation (17), which was developed to show the effect of invest-
ments outside the firm financed by an increase in earnings, can also
show the effect of an increase in the intensity of work "financed" by
an increase in earnings. Thus W and MP would show initial earnings
and productivity, C the increase in earnings, and G the gain to firms
from the increase in productivity caused by the "morale" effect of the
increase in earnings. The incentive to grant a morale-boosting in-
crease in earnings, therefore, would depend on the same factors as
36 See G. W. Hilton, "The British Truck System in the Nineteenth Century,"
Journal of Political Economy, April 1957, pp. 246-247.
37 If E represents reported earnings during the investment period and MP the
marginal product when there is no investment, E = MP — C with a general invest-
ment, E = MP with a specific investment paid by the firm, and E = MP + C with an
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does the incentive to grant an increase used for outside investments.
Many discussions of wages in underdeveloped countries have stressed
the latter,
3
8 while earlier discussions often stressed the former.
3
9
38 See Leibenstein, Journal of Political Economy, April 1957, and H. Oshima,
"Underdevelopment in Backward Economies: An Empirical Comment," Journal of
Political Economy, June 1958.
39 For example, Marshall stressed the effect of an increase in earnings on the char-
acter and habits of working people (Principles of Economics, pp. 529-532, 566-569).